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PRECAP; Mlekush v. Farmers Insurance Exchange: Defining the 




ORAL ARGUMENT is set for Wednesday, July 26, 2017 at 9:30 a.m., in 
the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek 
Building, Helena, Montana. 
 
I.   QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
Under Montana law, does the insurance exception to the American 
Rule apply in disputes as to value of a claim when coverage is not at issue? 
Further, if the insurance exception does apply, what standard, if any, 
should be used to determine whether an insured was “forced” within the 
meaning of the insurance exception? 
 
II.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Appellant Tanya Mlekush (“Mlekush”) was injured in an 
automobile collision for which the driver of the other vehicle admitted 
liability.1 In the underlying action, Mlekush sought reimbursement from 
her own auto insurance company, Farmers Insurance Exchange 
(“Farmers”), for her damages beyond the coverage limits of the other 
driver’s insurance.2 Upon the jury rendering a verdict in her favor, 
Mlekush moved the District Court for her attorney fees and costs.3  
On appeal, Mlekush argues the District Court erred in determining 
that Mlekush could not recover attorney fees and litigation costs from 
Farmers.4 Although Montana generally follows the “American Rule,” 
which requires each party bear its own expenses “absent a contractual or 
statutory provision to the contrary,” the Montana Supreme Court has 
recognized an “insurance exception” which entitles an insured to recover 
attorney fees in cases where an insurer forced the insured to “assume the 
burden of legal action to obtain the full benefit of the insurance contract.” 
5 Farmers concedes that, upon a finding that Mlekush was forced to resort 
to litigation, she would indeed be entitled to attorney fees and costs.6 
                                                          
1 Mlekush v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2015 MT 302, ¶ 3, 318 Mont. 292, 358 P.3d 913. 
2 Id. ¶ 6.  
3 Doc. 73, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Non-Taxable Costs (Aug. 1, 
2014). 
4 Appellant’s Opening Brief, Mlekush v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/search/case?case=20005# (Mont. Feb. 17, 2017) (DA 16-
0670). 
5 Winter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2014 MT 168, ¶ 31, 375 Mont. 351, 328 
P.3d 665; Winter, ¶ 31 (citing Mont. W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 2003 MT 98, ¶ 
36, 315 Mont. 231, 69 P.3d 652) (emphasis added). 
6 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 1, at *13. 




However, after complying with the Court’s directive to further develop the 
record on remand, the district court concluded the record does not support 
a finding that Mlkekush was forced to initiate legal proceedings in order 
to obtain the full value of the insurance.7 Arguing the district court to be 
in the best position to evaluate this issue, Farmers agrees with the district 
court’s determination that, under the given circumstances, awarding 
attorney fees under the insurance exception would be improper.8   
 As Farmers did not explicitly or implicitly deny Mlekush 
coverage, but merely disputed the value of the claim, the question remains: 
Was she forced to litigate as a result of Farmer’s valuation? The Montana 
Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether the insurance exception 
applies in disputes as to value of a claim when coverage is not at issue nor 
has it expressly established a standard to determine whether an insured 
was “forced” within the meaning of the insurance exception. 
 
III.   FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
 On January 15, 2011, Tanya Mlekush was injured in an 
automobile accident in which the driver of the other vehicle admitted 
liability.9  As a result, Mlekush recovered $50,000 from the other driver’s 
insurance policy limit for bodily injuries.10  
 At the time of the accident, Mlekush’s vehicle was insured with 
Farmers under a policy that included underinsured motorist (UIM) 
coverage with a $200,000 policy limit.11 On August 20, 2012, Mlekush 
executed a contingency fee agreement with her attorneys to represent her 
on her UIM claim, who then subsequently sent Farmers a letter of 
representation and asked Farmers to open a medical payments claim.12 
Correspondence continued over the following months and the parties 
exchanged information regarding Mlekush’s ongoing medical treatment, 
including medical bills and reports, prior related injuries, and claims for 
lost wages.13  
 On November 27, 2012, Mlekush underwent surgery as a result of 
injuries sustained during the accident.14 Over the following weeks, 
Mlekush gave Farmers updated medical and surgical reports and bills 
associated with her surgery and, as she had already incurred approximately 
$9,000 in medical expenses, requested Farmers to advance-pay her 
                                                          
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Mlekush, ¶ 3.  
10 Id. 
11 Id. ¶ 4. 
12 Id. 
13 Appellee’s Answer Brief, Mlekush v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/search/case?case=20005# (Mont. Apr. 18,2017) (No. DA 
16-0670). 
14 Mlekush, ¶ 6. 
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anticipated bills.15 However, according to Farmers, her treatment did not 
exceed the $50,000 she had received from the other driver’s insurer and 
evidence was unclear whether an injury she had suffered ten years prior to 
the accident was causally related to her injury.16 Farmers thus denied her 
request, stating: “We are not denying any demands. We are merely 
requesting additional information which is necessary for all parties to fully 
evaluate the matter.”17 
 Two days after receiving this response, Mlekush sued Farmers for 
wrongfully questioning causation on a clear medical record and denying 
advance-pay of surgical costs.18  
At trial, the Helena jury found for Mlekush and awarded her 
damages amounting to $450,000. However, because Mlkeush had initiated 
litigation before Farmers had an opportunity to fully assess her claim, the 
district court denied her request of attorney fees under the insurance 
exception to the American Rule.19  
 The Montana Supreme Court reversed this decision on appeal, 
stating the record as developed below was insufficient to allow for a 
conclusion either way.20 As the district court found the facts that Farmers 
did not deny Mlekush’s UIM coverage and Mlekush filed her complaint 
before the evidence was sufficiently developed dispositive on the issue, it 
never considered the other relevant factors necessary to determine whether 
the insurance exception applies such as: 
The amounts of the settlement offers, when they were 
made during the course of the litigation, whether they 
required a full and final release, what Mlekush’s 
responses to the offers were, and what relationship, if any, 
the increasing settlement offers bore to Mlekush’s 
increasing economic damages… [as well as] whether 
Mlekush made demands for advance payments or 
requested partial payments during the pendency of the 
litigation which were denied.21  
Finding that the district court incorrectly interpreted Montana law 
when it relied solely on the circumstances surrounding the filing of 
Mlekush’s complaint for its decision to deny attorney fees, the Court 
remanded the case back to district court for further proceedings to 
determine whether Farmers forced Mlekush to assume the burden of legal 
action to obtain the full benefit of her UIM policy, therefore entitling her 
to attorney fees under the insurance exception.22  
                                                          
15 Appellee’s Answer Brief, supra note 15, at *4. 
16 Id. 
17 Mlekush, ¶ 5. 
18 Id. ¶ 6. 
19 Id. ¶ 7. 
20 Id. ¶ 14. 
21 Id. ¶ 12. 
22 Id. ¶ 14. 




This case is being heard on appeal following the district court’s 
second determination that the record does not substantiate Mlekush’s 
claim of being “forced” to litigate to receive her entitled benefits under her 
UIM policy.23 After complying with the Court’s directive to develop the 
record concerning “the entire process leading up to the ultimate resolution 
of the claim,” the district court, again, concluded Mlekush was not entitled 
to attorney fees and costs under the “insurance exception” to the American 
Rule.24 
 
IV.   SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A.   District Court 
 
Originally, the district court determined Mlekush was not entitled 
to attorney fees under the insurance exception because Mlekush filed suit 
before evidence of the UIM claim sufficiently developed to settle.25 
However, after developing the complete relevant record on remand, and 
relying on the entirety of the evidence developed to evaluate whether the 
insurance exception should or should not be applied in this case, the 
District Court came to the same conclusion.26  
The fully developed record showed that Farmers made appropriate 
settlement offers, which changed as the evidence developed. 27  Farmers 
asserts Mlekush was never forced to initiate legal action to recover her 
entitled compensation under the insurance contract.28 Had she waited for 
the necessary evidence to support her UIM claim, there never would have 
been any reason to litigate matters in the first place.29 As the Court opined 
in Mlekush I, however, further analysis and development of the record to 
“consider the entirety of the litigation” was necessary when determining 
whether an insured was “forced” to litigate within the meaning of the 
insurance exception.30 
Thus, the district court looked deeper into all facts relevant to all 
stages of litigation and found that, while it was clear Farmers questioned 
causation prior to litigation and the jury subsequently ruled in Mlekush’s 
favor on this issue, it was not clear that its actions prior to litigation 
(requesting medical records related to an injury sustained in 2001) 
amounted to denial of her UIM claim.31 Rather, the district court found the 
record indicated that Farmers engaged in a reasonable course –gathering 
                                                          
23 Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 15, at*1. 
24 Id. at *3.  
25 Mlekush, ¶ 9. 
26 Appellee’s Answer Brief, supra note 15, at *3. 
27 Id. at *6-7. 
28 Id. at *10. 
29 Id. 
30 Mlekush, ¶ 9. 
31 Appellee’s Answer Brief, supra note 15, at *12. 
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information in an attempt to value and resolve her claim.32 Based on the 
information she provided, Farmers had reason to deny advance med-pay.33 
As Mlekush had received $4,000 in medical claim payments from Farmers 
and $50,000 from the other driver’s insurer, and her bills at that point 
totaled $46,016.15, the district court determined Farmers was reasonable 
to refuse advance payment of her claims.34 Since this refusal of advance 
payments did not amount to a denial of full benefits of the contract, the 
district court held the fully developed record only bolstered its earlier 
decision that Mlekush was not forced to turn to litigation which would 
entitle her to attorney fees and costs.35  
The district court found further analysis of the completely 
developed record only reinforced its earlier decision to deny attorney fees 
in demonstrating that Farmers negotiated in good faith as to its valuation 
of the claim.36 Shortly after Mlekush first demanded Ridley payments -
payments an insurance company is statutorily obligated to make when 
liability is reasonably clear –and  policy limits, Farmers offered 
$18,831.25 new money.37 When they mediated after the Mlekush’s second 
surgery, Farmers increased its offer to $57,000.38 Shortly thereafter, in its 
proposed offer of judgment, the settlement offer increased to $60,000, and 
eventually Farmers agreed to $77,500 in“new money.”39 The record 
indicates Farmers increased its offers when Mlekush provided updated 
information about her treatment and prognosis.40 Although Farmers did 
not offer the $200,000 policy limit she demanded, its offers were not 
unreasonably low given the information available.41 
 
B.   Appellant Tanya Mlekush 
 
Mlekush appeals the district court’s decision to deny her motion 
for attorney fees and costs, arguing that district court did not correctly 
apply the law to the facts developed on remand.42  The Court remanded 
the case with directions to assess the fully developed record to determine 
if Farmers forced Mlekush to bear the burden of legal action to recover the 
full benefit of her insurance contract.43 However, while the district court 
adhered to the Court’s directive to evaluate all the relevant evidence –not 
just focusing on whether Mlekush initiated litigation prematurely— 
                                                          
32 Id. 
33 Id. at *7. 
34 Id. at *12. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at *15. 
37 Id. at *6. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at *7-8. 
41 Id. at 17. 
42 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *1. 
43 Mlekush, ¶ 14. 




Mlekush argues it applied the wrong standard in determining whether she 
was “forced” to litigate within the meaning of the insurance exception.44 
According to Mlekush, current Montana jurisprudence and relevant policy 
considerations require this determination be made under the “Guessed 
Wrong” standard –where non-discretionary attorney fees and litigation 
expenses must be paid when an insurer “guesses wrong” and forces its 
insured to bear the burden of legal action to obtain the full benefit of her 
insurance contract.45 Instead, the district court performed a bad faith 
analysis and determined that, since Farmers acted “reasonably” and in 
“good faith, the insurance exception did not apply.46 Mlekush asserts that, 
had the district court applied the correct standard, it would have found the 
insurance exception to the American Rule did, in fact, entitle her to 
attorney fees and costs.47 
 
C.   Defendant and Appellee Farmers Insurance Exchange 
 
 Farmers argues that the district court did not err in finding the 
insurance exception did not apply because it completely adhered to the 
Court’s directive to evaluate all the relevant evidence in coming to its 
determination.48 Despite Mlekush’s contention, Farmers maintains that 
nothing in Mlekush I prohibited the district court from evaluating whether 
Farmers’ acted “reasonably” or in “good faith” in assessing whether it 
“forced” Mlekush to assume the burden of legal action within the meaning 
of the insurance exception.49  
Farmers argues that since its actions were reasonable given the 
surrounding circumstances and acted in good faith, as demonstrated by the 
record, Mlekush lacks the necessary proof to support the assertion that she 
was forced to assume the burden of legal action within the meaning of the 
insurance exception.50  
Farmers argues that, as evidenced above, the district court 
followed the Court’s direction to consider both parties’ actions during the 
entire process leading up to the ultimate resolution of the claim in 
determining whether the insurance exception applied.51 Contrary to 
Mlekush’s assertion, nothing in Mlekush I prohibited the district court 
from evaluating whether Farmers acted “reasonably” or in “good faith” in 
assessing whether it “forced” Mlekush to assume the burden of legal action 
within the meaning of the insurance exception.52 Arguing the district court 
                                                          
44 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *9. 
45 Id. 
46 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 1, at *5. 
47 Id. at *12.  
48 Appellee’s Answer Brief, supra note 15, at *13. 
49 Id. at *15. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at *15.  
52 Id. 
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to be in the best position to evaluate this issue, and nothing in Mlekush I 
suggested the district court could not characterize the evidence in whatever 
manner it saw fit, Farmers’ contends no reversible error was made in 
reaching this factual determination. 53 
 
V.   ANALYSIS 
 
Generally, Montana adheres to the American Rule regarding 
attorneys’ fees that requires each party to bear their own expenses.54 
Although Montana does allow exceptions to this rule, these exceptions are 
narrow.55 Should the Court decide to accept Mlekush’s argument and 
adopt the “Guessed Wrong” standard, however, the insurance exception 
may just do as Farmers asserts and swallow the rule.56  
Considering only the Court’s opinion in Mlekush I and the 
rationale behind the case’s remand articulated within, it is unlikely the 
Court will overrule the district court’s decision. Despite Mlekush’s 
assertion that the insurance exception always applies whenever the insurer 
“guesses wrong,” a closer reading of the Montana Supreme Court’s last 
opinion on the subject clearly shows no such “bright-line” line rule was 
ever intended.57 On the contrary, the Court held this exception was to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, emphasizing the necessity for the 
district court to not just consider the insured’s filing of the complaint, but 
“the entirety of the litigation in determining whether, and to what extent 
an insured was forced to assume the burden of legal action in order to 
recover the full benefit of the insurance contract.”58 
Despite the apparent mischaracterization of Mlekush I, the policy 
considerations behind the insurance exception provide sufficient weight to 
Mlekush’s proposed “Guessed Wrong” standard to warrant an oral 
argument. As pointed out in Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Brewer, the Montana Supreme Court has the authority to “interpret, 
modify, and apply common law principles in the absence of legislative 
preemption.”59 There is no dispute that the American Rule and its 
corresponding exceptions are derived from the common law. 60 Further, 
the Court has established that it has an obligation to reform common law 
“as justice requires.”61 Although the Brewer Court did not hold the 
insurance exception applied to the case presented, it effectively established 
a willingness to modify this exception should the moving party present 
                                                          
53 Id. at *13. 
54 Jacobsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2009 MT 248, ¶ 23, 351 Mont. 464, 215 P.3d 649. 
55 Id. 
56 Appellee’s Reply Brief, supra note 15, at *20. 
57 Mlekush, ¶ 9. 
58 Id. ¶ 11. 
59 2003 MT 98, ¶ 24, 315 Mont. 231, 69 P.3d 652.  
60 Schuff v. A.T. Klemens & Son, 2000 MT 357, ¶ 97, 303 Mont. 274, 16 P.3d 1002. 
61 Pence v. Fox, 248 Mont. 521, 524, 813 P.2d 429, 431 (1991).  




“cited authority compelling to hold an insurer liable for attorney fees.”62 
Should the policy considerations behind Mlekush’s “Guessed Wrong” 
prove weighty enough, the Court may just expand the exception to avoid 
injustice.  
So, which is it? Would the adoption of the “Guessed Wrong” 
standard completely swallow the American Rule –the rule which Montana 
has expressed as being “a foundation of our jurisprudence, and we must 
narrowly construe the exceptions lest they swallow the rule” –or do the 
policy considerations surrounding this case require the Court modify the 
insurance exception to automatically apply whenever the insurer “guesses 
wrong?” Either way, the Court’s decision will have a far-reaching impact 
on Montana jurisprudence –effectively illustrating oral advocacy’s true 
purpose and the essential role it plays in ensuring the sanctity of the justice 
system.    
 
                                                          
62 Brewer, ¶ 36. 
